Let’s say I lend a software company $100 for five years at 8% interest. I give the company $100 in cash, and it gives me back a note promising to pay me back, which I enter into my accounting system as a $100 asset. The next day, Anthropic releases some new artificial intelligence tool, people get nervous about the software business, and software stocks and bonds drop. The yields on loans to other software companies, companies that are similar to my borrower, go up by 0.5% over the course of the day. I call up my borrower to check in, and they say “oh yeah, we saw that headline but we’re not too worried, everything’s fine.” How much is my asset — the company’s note — worth?

There is a conventional answer, which is about $98.^[1] The price of a debt instrument moves inversely with interest rates; as the market demands higher interest rates from borrowers like my software company, the value of those companies’ existing debt goes down. If I sold my note for $98, the buyer would get a yield of 8.5%, which is the new market rate. The “mark-to-market value” of my note is $98.

But I might object: Well, no, I’m not going to sell my note for $98, or for any other price. I’m just going to wait my five years, collect 8% interest along the way, and get $100 at the end. I thought that proposition was worth $100 yesterday, and I think it’s worth $100 today. Nothing has changed, with the asset, or the company, or me. Oh sure sure sure stuff in the outside markets has changed, and other people are more nervous about software credit. But I don’t see how that affects me. I am not more nervous. They’ll probably change their minds tomorrow; it is nonsense to say that this loan was worth $100 yesterday and $98 today and for all I know $101 tomorrow. It’ll pay $100 in five years with interest, it’s a perfectly good performing loan, it’s worth $100 until I have some objective reason to think that it isn’t.^[2]

Probably a lot of you got very itchy reading that last paragraph, and I promise that I got very itchy writing it. But I want to argue that it’s not insane, and that which answer — $98 or $100 — is “correct” depends on the purposes for which you are using the answer. Here are some purposes:

1. If I run a hedge fund, the right answer is $98, and it is very important that I mark this note to market in my accounting system. For one thing, just as a matter of intellectual rigor and market discipline, my job is to make money every day, and I need to know exactly what every asset is worth on the market so that I can make good trades. (If I am trading notes like this every day, it seems silly for me to say “well I won’t sell this one so it’s worth $100.”) Also, a lot of outside people rely on my marks. I charge my investors a performance fee — 20% of their gains or whatever — based on market returns, so I need to price everything using market prices. And I probably have a lot of leverage — I borrow a lot of money from banks, secured by my investments — and the banks are sure going to mark those assets to market. The banks are giving me margin loans against the value of my assets, and if that value goes down — measured by market prices — I will get margin calls. 
2. If I run a mutual fund or exchange-traded fund, the right answer is $98, and mark-to-market accounting is again very important. Not, mostly, for the hedge fund’s reasons: I don’t charge performance fees or, probably, borrow much. But because the investors in my mutual fund can get daily liquidity: Every day, they can take money out or put money in. They will do this “at NAV”: If they take money out, I will pay them the net asset value of their shares; if they put money in, I will sell them shares at the net asset value. If the net asset value of my fund does not reflect market prices, this will collapse: If my investors can take out $100 when their shares are only worth $98, then they will take out too much money and leave remaining investors with too little. Also, if the investors take out too much money, they can effectively force me to sell the note (to pay them back), so its value really has to be $98, the price I could sell it for today.
3. If I run a bank, I am a very special snowflake and generally am not supposed to mark loans to market in my financial statements. “I loaned the company $100, nothing has changed, so that’s worth $100” is the normal way that banks account for loans. The theory of a bank is that it can make loans and hold them to maturity, so it doesn’t need to mark them up and down to reflect fluctuating markets. There is some complication and nuance to this, a lot of people don’t like it, and it is not clear that it is really defensible anymore. We talked about it a lot in 2023, when there was a bit of a crisis in US regional banking, much of it caused by this sort of thing: Banks do not generally mark their loans to market in part because they assume they have stable funding and can hold the loans to maturity, and the 2023 regional banking crisis was a stark reminder that banks’ funding isn’t really that stable.
4. If I am just a person investing my own money, none of this matters at all and I can tell myself anything I want. It is probably psychologically healthier for me not to check the market too often or worry too much about fluctuating market prices, so here $100 does kind of feel like the right answer.

Of course the trillion-dollar question right now is: What if I run a private credit fund? I lend a software company $100, the market starts to panic about software, I think the loan is fine: How do I value it in my financial statements and investor communications and my secret heart of hearts? It’s worth thinking about from first principles:

• In some deep sense, what I am selling to investors, as a private asset manager, is a psychologically healthy relationship with their investments: I am selling them an asset that doesn’t trade every day, that doesn’t fluctuate with market prices, that doesn’t overreact to news, that appears uncorrelated with public markets. The fact that public markets are panicking about software credit has nothing to do with me, and deep down it is my job to shield my investors from those fluctuations. So, $100.
• A thing that I and others have emphasized💡 Matt Levine's "Money Stuff" newsletter from December 20, 2019, explores counterintuitive financial theories suggesting that bad outcomes can be beneficial, starting with the idea that investors prefer risk to safety, leading risky high-beta assets to demand lower risk-adjusted returns than low-beta ones. It references a 2013 AQR Capital Management paper by Andrea Frazzini and Lasse Heje Pedersen on "Betting Against Beta," alongside concepts like the "missing risk premium" and "low volatility anomaly," which support why risky investments are often priced higher. The piece ends with a holiday programming note, announcing a break until January 6. about private credit is that it has a much more stable funding model than banks: Banks fund themselves with short-term deposits and so are vulnerable to runs that might force them to sell assets, while private credit loans are funded mostly with long-term locked-up investor capital that can’t run. So if banks don’t mark to market — “we don’t need to sell so the loan is worth what we paid for it” — then a fortiori neither should private credit. So, $100.
• But that’s only mostly true. In fact, private credit firms run retail-focused funds (“business development companies” or BDCs), some of which do allow investors to take money out — not as much as they want anytime they want, but a limited amount once per quarter. These transactions happen “at NAV,” and just like any other mutual fund, it is important that the net asset value be correct. If my net asset value doesn’t reflect market prices, investors are going to rush to redeem, because they want to get 100 cents on the dollar for assets that are worth 98. And if I pay them out at 100, then the remaining investors’ assets will only be worth 96, etc. So, $98.
• Also, private credit funds do use leverage💡 A Bloomberg opinion piece humorously explores how MBA class projects, often based on real business scenarios like developing a golf resort, can blur the line between simulation and reality. Students build financial models, create presentations, and pitch ideas, sometimes leading them to believe the opportunity is genuine enough to pursue post-graduation, potentially landing jobs in the actual industry. The article reflects on the value of such "pretend" business exercises in business school curricula, noting their role in preparing students for real-world careers despite the hypothetical nature. . They don’t generally borrow as much or as short-term as banks or hedge funds, but they do some borrowing, some of it from banks💡 US banks have significantly increased lending to non-bank financial institutions (NDFIs) like private credit firms, private equity, and hedge funds, adapting to a shifting market where non-banks now dominate certain lending segments. This surge reached $363 billion in new loans through November 2025, up 26% year-over-year, outpacing other loan growth and reflecting banks' strategic pivot amid non-bank expansion to $17 trillion in outstanding loans. However, this growing entanglement raises risks, with regulators like the IMF warning of potential capital hits to banks from non-bank stress, alongside reports of private credit distress including deferred payments and lender takeovers. , secured by their assets. The banks will take a keen interest in how much the assets are worth, they will want to keep their loan-to-value ratios low, and they might even have the right to send margin calls if the assets lose too much value. If I am getting margin loans against my assets, you’d better believe that those assets are getting marked to market — and probably by the bank, not me. So, $98.
• Also, like hedge funds, private credit funds tend to charge management fees (a percentage of assets) and performance fees (a percentage of profits), so correctly measuring asset prices is important. (This is less important in private funds, which often charge fees based on committed capital and realized distributions rather than market prices.)

One way to put it is that, when you look at the simple core function of private credit — raising long-term locked-up funds from institutional investors with low leverage to make loans that are held to maturity and don’t trade — you might think “ehh it’s fine not to mark to market very carefully; just assume most loans are worth what you paid for them.” And then if you look at the modern expansion of private credit — raising lots of semi-liquid money from individual investors, borrowing more money, trading the underlying loans💡 Summary of "You Can't Exactly Buy Stock in Athletes" (Bloomberg Opinion, June 25, 2025, by Matt Levine): The article uses the analogy of an early-stage startup investor who puts in $100,000 for 10% equity at a $1 million valuation, only for the company to explode to $100 billion—turning the investment into $10 billion—but highlights how this doesn't directly apply to athletes. It discusses challenges in investing in individual athletes' future success, akin to startup equity but complicated by factors like career uncertainty, and touches on related financial innovations such as private credit trading desks, PRIMEs, and SCOREs. The piece implies growing interest in athlete-linked investments amid broader sports finance trends, though direct stock ownership remains impractical.  — you might think “eek, actually it’s very important to mark to market rigorously and frequently.” And so you might tell a story in which private credit started out with a bank-like, hold-to-maturity, “it’s worth $100 until they stop making payments” mentality, and is now transitioning into a rigorous real-time mark-to-market mentality.

And so Bloomberg’s Laura Benitez and Hannah Levitt report today💡 Apollo Global Management plans to introduce daily valuations for its private credit assets to address criticisms about transparency and pricing accuracy in the opaque market. The move responds to concerns over infrequent markings, soured loans in some funds, and investor demands for more reliable liquidity amid rising defaults in sectors like software. This initiative aims to enhance investor confidence as Apollo positions private credit as a $40 trillion opportunity spanning areas like real estate debt and asset-backed securities. :

Apollo Global Management Inc. is ramping up its efforts to give investors more regular insight into the value of its opaque private credit holdings, just as a spate of redemption requests from such funds rattles the wider market.

The firm, which manages $938 billion of assets, is preparing to start reporting the net asset values of its credit funds on a monthly basis, John Zito, the co-president of Apollo’s asset management arm, said in an interview. Ultimately, it aims for both daily NAVs and third-party valuations over time.

Meanwhile, though, there is a lot of pressure on private credit firms’ net asset values. We have talked💡 The Bloomberg Money Stuff newsletter from February 23, 2026, addresses investor concerns over Blue Owl Capital's liquidity amid redemptions from its private credit funds. It argues that private credit firms like Blue Owl won't be forced to sell loans at steep discounts (e.g., 65 cents on the dollar), using the 2018 Greenlight Capital example to illustrate how strict withdrawal limits protect funds during poor performance, countering complaints about "onerous" terms. The piece frames this as a structural feature of private credit, distinguishing it from more liquid markets vulnerable to forced sales. a lot💡 Blackstone's flagship private credit fund, BCRED (with ~$82 billion in assets), faced record redemptions of 7.9% (~$3.8 billion) in Q1 2026 from investors concerned about liquidity, falling interest rates, and rising corporate defaults amid private credit industry unease. The firm met requests via an expanded 7% tender offer and internal offsets by Blackstone and employees, emphasizing that such funds aren't designed for full liquidity. This reflects broader strains, including BlackRock limiting withdrawals from its $26 billion HPS fund to 5% after 9.3% requests, alongside worries over AI-vulnerable software loans and leveraged loan holdings in BDCs. recently💡 No direct access to the specified Bloomberg newsletter at the provided URL is available in search results. Instead, related March 5, 2026, Bloomberg content discusses market volatility amid US-Israel strikes on Iran, surging oil prices, and geopolitical risks. Key themes include Wall Street bulls maintaining S&P 500 rally forecasts despite shocks, central banks likely prioritizing growth slowdowns over inflation from energy spikes, and investor resilience in emerging markets. Broader coverage highlights labor market firmness, AI chip demand (e.g., Broadcom's projections), and potential political fallout for Trump. about💡 BlackRock is restricting withdrawals from its private credit funds amid surging redemption requests, a core feature of the industry's "locked-up" investor model designed to prevent fire sales of illiquid loans. The $26 billion HPS Corporate Lending Fund capped repurchases at 5% despite 9.3% requests, returning about $620 million instead of $1.2 billion, signaling broader investor anxiety in the $1.8 trillion private credit sector triggered by high-profile blowups and exposures like software firms vulnerable to AI. This "gating" strategy, as highlighted in Matt Levine's analysis, underscores private credit's reliance on long-term commitments for stability, high returns, and light regulation, even as firms like BlackRock and Blackstone face pressure from retail outflows. how💡 Matt Levine's "Everyone Wants a Pension" newsletter explains the core retirement savings challenge: workers typically save during 40 years of earning more than they spend, then draw down savings over 30 years of retirement spending more than they earn. It models ideal saving as investing about 15% of income at 7-8% annual returns to enable a sustainable 4% annual withdrawal rate in retirement, though this varies by individual circumstances like lifespan and retirement age. The piece frames broader pension trends—such as pooled funds' appeal for predictable long-term investing amid rising interest in private assets—against individual savers' need for liquidity. private credit BDCs have been getting a lot of redemption requests from individual investors, and how they either have or have not met those requests. One way to think about it is that those redemption requests are a form of NAV arbitrage. If a BDC says that its loans are worth $100, but you think their market value is only $98, you should try to redeem out of that BDC: You’ll get cashed out at $100, which is more than you think it’s worth. We talked about this back in January💡 The specified URL (https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/newsletters/2026-01-26/private-credit-marks-will-matter) does not appear in the available search results, so a direct summary of that article is unavailable. Related recent Bloomberg coverage on private credit highlights growing investor risks and market shifts: firms are loosening loan covenants to compete with Wall Street, sacrificing safeguards against downturns; buyers may be underestimating hazards while chasing yields, per Pimco's president; and the sector is expanding into retiree funds and high-stakes bets amid a hot $41 trillion credit market. These trends, discussed in January 2026 newsletters and reports, point to heightened competition, leverage concerns, and eroding protections in private credit. , when I wrote that, “if you let investors take their money back, you will generally do it at NAV, … so NAVs really matter”:

It is a classic bank run dynamic: If a private credit investment is worth $7, but you can cash out for $8, you should, and everyone will, and eventually there will be $0 left. And everyone knows this and will be twitchy.

The fact that private credit BDCs are getting historically high levels of redemptions might suggest that their investors don’t believe their marks. And BDCs limit redemptions to guard against this: If too many people are cashing out, that suggests that the fund is cashing them out for more than the actual value of their shares.^[3] The fund sort of lives in the old hold-to-maturity world, but its investors live in a mark-to-market world. 

You know who else lives in a mark-to-market world? At the Financial Times, Jill Shah and Eric Platt report:

JPMorgan Chase ... informed private credit lenders that it had marked down the value of certain loans in their portfolios, which serve as the collateral the funds use to borrow from the bank, according to people familiar with the matter. ...

The loans that have been devalued are to software companies, which are seen as particularly vulnerable to the onset of AI. ...

One person briefed on the bank’s decision said the valuation haircuts did not trigger margin calls at funds but were done to pre-emptively reduce the amount of credit available to the funds. …

Publicly traded software stocks and debt have all plummeted this year. Private credit lenders, by contrast, tend to hold loans for the entire term and have not marked down their portfolios in lockstep.

Private lenders have said enterprise software companies are still growing and expect their loans to continue performing, as investors backstop the borrowers. 

“Enterprise software companies are still growing and [we] expect their loans to continue performing” is not something you can say to a margin lender. Or at least, not to JPMorgan:

JPMorgan is somewhat of an outlier in the private credit financing business as it reserves the right to revalue assets at any time. Most other banks require triggers such as missed interest payments.

At some level, marking private credit loans to market still feels wrong even to most banks.

I wrote yesterday▸ about how Kalshi and Polymarket are now offering binary options on where the S&P 500 stock index will close. There are, you know, various things to say about that, but one thing I said is that binary options are a particularly appealing product for retail investors because they are so simple. We discussed a 2025 paper,“Overvaluing simple bets: Evidence from the options market,” by Aaron Goodman and Indira Puri, finding that traders systematically pay more for binary options than they do for “strictly dominant bull spreads,” that is, conventional option combinations that pay more than the binaries in every situation. Why would you pay more for a product that is always worse? Well, because it is simple and easy to understand.

But then I went on to quote the Bloomberg News story about the prediction-market S&P 500 contracts, which said that “the price on Kalshi for the S&P 500 Index ending the year between 8,000 and 8,200 points” was about 4 cents on the dollar ($2,190 for a $44,000 payoff), while “in the options market, one could pay a $2,190 premium to bet on a 8,000/8,200 call spread,” with a maximum profit of $20,000 per contract. And I said: “Sounds like the Kalshi call spread is cheaper?”

Quite a few readers emailed to point out that, nope, these are not comparable trades: If the index finishes above the 8,200 cap, the Kalshi contract pays out zero, while the conventional call spread pays out the maximum. It is not quite strictly dominant (it pays less in the 8,000/8,200 band), but it is also not right to say that the Kalshi call spread is cheaper. Sorry.

Nothing in this column is ever legal advice, but in this section, you should especially assume that every sentence ends with “(not legal advice!”). Anyway:

We talked yesterday💡 Bill Ackman is seeking to raise between $5 billion and $10 billion for Pershing Square USA in a combined deal, offering investors the opportunity to buy shares in the fund. The fundraising effort represents Ackman's push to expand capital under management as he continues positioning his highly concentrated portfolio of long-duration compounders heading into 2026. about whether Cluely did a little light securities fraud. Roy Lee, the co-founder and chief executive officer of the artificial intelligence startup, told a TechCrunch journalist some wrong numbers for Cluely’s annual recurring revenue, which the journalist then published. Later, Lee apparently asked ChatGPT “is this securities fraud,” and ChatGPT said no. Then he posted the exchange on X.

My point yesterday was that several people sent me this exchange to be like “well, is it?” and that I basically agree with ChatGPT. But I also pointed out that “there are various not-best-practices things here,” and asking ChatGPT for legal advice is one of them. Not only in the sense that ChatGPT might get its legal advice wrong, but also in the sense that ChatGPT is not your lawyer and so your conversations with it are not privileged. If you call your lawyer and say “hey I think I did a little light securities fraud, what do you think,” and your lawyer says “yep definitely fraud,” your lawyer won’t go call the police to turn you in, and the police can’t make her: Your conversations with her are subject to attorney-client privilege. Whereas ChatGPT is not a lawyer, it’s a chatbot, and so it might turn over your conversations to the police. Here’s a Perkins Coie memo from last month:

On February 17, 2026, the Southern District of New York, in United States v. Bradley Heppner, held that a criminal defendant's written exchanges with a “publicly available AI platform” are not protected by attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine and, thus, could be inspected by the government. The ruling appears to be the first federal decision squarely addressing privilege claims for communications with a generative AI platform of this type.

He was allegedly doing some securities fraud, got caught, asked ChatGPT for advice, and ultimately had to turn over the advice to the FBI:

After receiving a grand jury subpoena and becoming aware that he was the target of a criminal investigation, the defendant—acting on his own initiative without instruction from counsel—used a free generative AI platform to prepare documents outlining his potential defense strategy and responses to potential charges. …

The defendant later provided the AI-generated documents to his counsel, who reviewed them.

In October 2025, a grand jury indicted the defendant on securities fraud and related charges arising from alleged misconduct as a public company executive.

Upon arrest in November 2025, the FBI executed a search warrant at the defendant’s home and seized materials including the documents generated by the defendant’s use of the AI platform.

Right, don’t do that. Though in Roy Lee’s case he posted ChatGPT’s advice on X, which also seems like it would undermine the privilege.

I occasionally say around here💡 Matt Levine's "Everyone Wants a Pension" newsletter explains the core retirement savings challenge: workers typically save during 40 years of earning more than they spend, then draw down savings over 30 years of retirement spending more than they earn. It models ideal saving as investing about 15% of income at 7-8% annual returns to enable a sustainable 4% annual withdrawal rate in retirement, though this varies by individual circumstances like lifespan and retirement age. The piece frames broader pension trends—such as pooled funds' appeal for predictable long-term investing amid rising interest in private assets—against individual savers' need for liquidity. , half-jokingly, that the stock market is a random number generator for gambling. At a micro level, a company’s stock price is obviously not a random number; it reflects the market’s expectation about the company’s future earnings, it will be higher if the company does good business things and lower if it does bad business things, and it is all analyzable in a logical deterministic way. But markets are highly competitive and pretty efficient and for most people the future path of a stock price might as well be random.

Random number generators are of course important in gambling, which is why it is funny to half-joke that the stock market is a random number generator, but they are also important in computer science and cybersecurity. Some good (imperfect!) ways to generate random numbers are flipping coins, rolling dice, etc., but computers are pretty deterministic and don’t have hands, so they can’t do that. There is thus a demand for a source of random numbers that computers can use. Is it the stock market? A reader sent me this program from a “Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2026” conference last week, which includes a paper on “Ultra-high frequency random beacons from financial tick sequences” by Silvia Onofri, Andrey Shternshis, and Stefano Marmi. Here is their related paper:

At an appropriate scale depending on the specific financial asset, multiple sequences pass standard randomness tests. Consequently, we propose a model-free approach for generating pseudo-random sequences from financial data, which can be leveraged for further cryptographic and other applications.

So there you go, the stock market is a useful random number generator.

Regulators Plan to Relax Some Capital Proposals▸💡 US regulators plan to relax certain capital proposals for Wall Street banks, building on a broader deregulatory trend under the Trump administration that eases requirements like the enhanced supplementary leverage ratio tied to Treasuries. This would allow major lenders such as Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, and Goldman Sachs to hold less capital relative to total assets, potentially unlocking up to $2.6 trillion in lending capacity through 2026 and boosting earnings, mergers, and technology investments. The moves follow earlier proposals dramatically scaling back Biden-era hikes, with recent actions including narrower bank supervision and new risk-sensitive mortgage capital rules under Basel III. for Wall Street. Pushing private assets▸💡 The Financial Times article, titled "US banks face $1tn in unrealised losses on securities as Fed holds rates," reports that major US banks are grappling with approximately $1 trillion in unrealised losses on their bond holdings due to higher interest rates persisting since 2022. These losses, primarily on Treasury and mortgage-backed securities, have not been realised but strain bank balance sheets amid the Federal Reserve's steady policy stance. Regulators are monitoring the situation closely, with some banks like New York Community Bancorp already facing deposit outflows and credit rating pressures. : are Europe’s investors at risk of a mis-selling scandal? Blackstone, Blue Owl Take Minority Stake in US Private Equity Firm Atlas▸💡 Blackstone Inc. and Blue Owl Capital Inc. announced on March 10, 2026, a strategic minority investment in Atlas Holdings, a Greenwich, Connecticut-based private equity firm founded in 2002 that manages over $16 billion in assets across 30 industrial, manufacturing, and distribution businesses. The deal, executed through Blackstone's GP Stakes business and Blue Owl's GP Strategic Capital platform, marks their first joint GP stakes investment and aims to leverage Atlas's operational expertise in complex situations while providing resources for growth, talent retention, and portfolio support. Financial terms were not disclosed, and Atlas plans to maintain its disciplined, long-term approach. . Morgan Stanley Cuts Jobs▸💡 Morgan Stanley is cutting about 3% of its global workforce, affecting employees across investment banking, trading, wealth management, and asset management divisions, including both front- and back-office roles. The layoffs, estimated at around 2,500 jobs, are linked to individual performance reviews, shifts in business priorities, and location strategies, despite the firm's strong recent financial performance. Implementation could begin as early as March 2026. Across All of Its Business Lines. Deleted Tweet▸💡 On March 10, 2026, US Energy Secretary Chris Wright posted on X (formerly Twitter) claiming the US Navy had successfully escorted an oil tanker through the Iranian-blockaded Strait of Hormuz, causing WTI crude futures to plummet up to 19% from around $118 per barrel as traders anticipated restored oil flows. The post was deleted within 20 minutes, with the White House denying the event and the Department of Energy calling it an "incorrectly captioned" video, leading to partial market rebound and heightened skepticism amid ongoing US-Iran conflict tensions. This "whipsaw" volatility, the largest since 2020, amplified a "fear premium" in oil prices and raised concerns over government communication reliability during geopolitical crises. From Energy Secretary Sends Oil Markets on Another Wild Ride. Gulf disruption chokes sulphur flows▸💡 I could not access or retrieve the content of the specified Financial Times article at https://www.ft.com/content/dd2498cc-d221-4645-9fae-34d1d832c15d, likely due to paywall restrictions or access limitations in the available search results. The provided search results do not contain or reference this article, instead covering unrelated topics like Bezant Resources PLC share chat and geopolitics in the Strait of Ormuz. If you can provide the article text or an alternative accessible source, I can summarize it accurately. supporting swaths of global industry. Oil Trader Pierre Andurand▸💡 Pierre Andurand's Andurand Commodities Discretionary Enhanced fund, which has no set risk limits, gained 6% last week amid extreme commodity price swings triggered by the war in Iran that disrupted many other hedge funds. The French hedge fund manager, known for high-conviction oil bets and managing about $2 billion in assets, capitalized on the chaos in energy markets. People familiar with the matter noted the performance details are private, highlighting Andurand's history of volatile but strong returns in commodities like oil. Made 6% Last Week in Chaotic Market. Hedge fund Caxton loses more than $600mn in Iran war fallout. Ackman’s Compensation and Other News We Learned From Pershing Square’s Filings▸💡 Bill Ackman's Pershing Square Capital Management filed on March 10, 2026, to raise $5-10 billion through an IPO for a new closed-end fund called Pershing Square USA (ticker: PSUS) on the NYSE, alongside listing its parent company (ticker: PS), marking his second attempt after a failed $25 billion plan in 2024. Investors buying 100 shares of the closed-end fund receive 20 free shares of the parent company, with a minimum order size of $5,000, aiming to secure permanent capital like Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway and reduce reliance on short-term hedge fund redemptions. The firm projects $762 million in 2025 revenue ($532 million from performance fees, $230 million from management fees) and already has a listed vehicle in Europe. . Bank of England fines Direct Line £10mn for overstating capital▸💡 The Financial Times article, titled "US banks face $1tn in unrealised losses on securities," reports that major US banks are grappling with approximately $1 trillion in unrealised losses on their bond holdings as of late 2025, driven by higher interest rates and prolonged inverted yield curves. These losses, concentrated in Treasury and mortgage-backed securities, have raised concerns about potential balance sheet strains similar to those seen during the 2023 regional banking crisis, though regulators note improved liquidity buffers. Bank executives warn that without rate cuts, these paper losses could persist into 2026, impacting capital ratios and dividend policies. . The Tycoon Who Had a Secret Life as an Alleged Scam Kingpin▸💡 Chen Zhi, a Chinese-born tycoon who founded Cambodia's Prince Group, allegedly built a multi-billion dollar global scam empire while cultivating political connections and a facade of legitimate business operations. Through lavish networking events on his superyacht and strategic gift-giving, Chen constructed a web of influence involving Cambodian politicians and wealthy businessmen that helped shield him from accountability for years. His sprawling criminal network operated across more than 30 countries, allegedly running "pig butchering" scam hubs—a type of romance and investment fraud—while using legitimate businesses like casinos and real estate to launder stolen cryptocurrency funds. . Lloyd’s of London says it will still insure ‘basically anyone▸💡 The Financial Times article, titled "US banks face $1tn in losses from commercial real estate crisis," reports that major US banks could suffer up to $1 trillion in losses due to a sharp decline in commercial property values, particularly office buildings, amid high vacancy rates and remote work trends post-pandemic. It highlights banks like New York Community Bancorp, which recently disclosed a $2.1 billion charge on soured loans, triggering broader sector concerns and stock selloffs. Regulators are urging banks to bolster reserves, with potential Federal Reserve intervention if distress spreads. ’ in the Gulf. Merger blocked after lawyers Simpson Thacher miss deadline▸💡 FT Article Summary: "US banks face $1tn in unrealised losses on bond portfolios" (Published October 3, 2023) US banks are grappling with approximately $1 trillion in unrealised losses on their bond holdings, primarily due to rising interest rates that have eroded the value of long-duration Treasury and mortgage-backed securities. The article highlights how these "paper losses" pose systemic risks, especially for smaller regional banks with concentrated exposures, echoing vulnerabilities exposed during the 2023 banking crisis involving Silicon Valley Bank. Federal Reserve data underscores the scale, with total unrealised losses hitting $1.05 trillion as of Q2 2023, prompting calls for enhanced regulatory scrutiny and balance sheet transparency. for appeal.

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